In real life there are game problems in which players face with certain restrictions in the choice of strategy. These decision problems lead to constrained games. The quadratic programming problem equivalent to a constrained bimatrix game is shown which provides a general method solving constrained bi-matrix games and shows a perfect correspondence between games and programming problems. Besides, a two-step method for constrained games is proposed whose theme is transforming the constrained game into an equivalent ordinary game. In the end, an example is shown to illustrate consistency of the two methods.
INTRODUCTION
There are game problems in real life where the strategies of players are constrained to satisfy certain linear equations or inequalities rather than being in whole strategy space. These decision problems lead to constrained games first introduced by Charnes [1, 2] . He proved that constrained games can be solved by solving a pair of mutually dual linear programming problems and extended the concept to nperson constrained games. Later it was studied by Kawaguchi and Maruyama [3] in somewhat more generality which widens the scope of game-theoretic approaches. It is shown that the proposed approaches can handle uncertainty in the inequality constraints. More recently, constraints have been introduced in NTU coalitional games and Markov games [4, 5] . Also, a certain constrained dynamic game is shown to be equivalent to a pair of symmetric dual variational problems by Husain and Ahmad [6] . Various duality results are proved under convexity and generalized convexity assumptions on the appropriate functionals. Slightly different from the above-mentioned study, following Charnes's chart, we are more concerned about whether constrained bi-matrix games exist similar results as in constrained matrix games.
PRELIMINARIES ON MATRIX GAMES AND BI-MATRIX GAMES
In this section, we present certain basic definitions and preliminaries with regard to matrix games and bi-matrix games. Theorem 2.1 guarantees that every matrix game has a solution. If there is no solution in the pure form then there is certainly a solution in the mixed form. Not long after the invention of simplex method, Kuhn and Tucker et al. [7] pointed out that solving a matrix game is equivalent to solving a pair of primal-dual linear programming.
In matrix game, one player's gain is just the other player's loss. Obviously there are situations in which the interests of two players are not exactly opposite. Such situations give rise to two person non-zero sum matrix games, also called bi-matrix games. Some well known bi-matrix game examples are "The Prisoner's Dilemma", "The Battle of Sexes" and "The Bargaining Problem".
A bi-matrix game is expressed as BG = (S m , S n , A, B), where A and B are m n real matrices representing the payoffs to Player I and Player respectively. In the context of bi-matrix game, the following theorem due to Nash is very basic as it guarantees the existence of an equilibrium point of the bi-matrix game BG.
Theorem 2.2 (Nash existence theorem [8])
. Every bimatrix game BG = (S m , S n , A, B) has at least one equilibrium point.
As already mentioned that every matrix game can be solved by solving a suitable primal-dual linear programming problems, Mangasarian and Stone [9] established a similar result to show that an equilibrium point of a bi-matrix game can be obtained by solving an appropriate quadratic programming problem.
Theorem 2.3 (Equivalence theorem). Let
n , A, B) be the given bi-matrix game. A necessary and sufficient condition that (x * , y * ) be an equilibrium point of BG is that it is a solution of the following quadratic programming problem. If let B = A, theorem 1.3 is reduced to a dual pair of linear programming that is equivalent to a matrix game.
CONSTRA NED B -MATR X GAMES AND EQU VALENT QUADRAT C PROGRAMM NG
There are certain game problems in real life where the strategies of players are constrained to satisfy several linear inequalities rather than being in S m or S n only. These decision problems lead to constrained games. A main result due to of Charnes [1] in the constrained matrix game theory, as in usual matrix games, assert that every CMG is equivalent to two primal-dual linear programming problems.
Then a natural question is coming: Is there a quadratic programming problem equivalent to a given CBG? The answer is yes.
Since the constraints are linear, if not empty, the strategy set of Player I, namely S 1 (respectively S 2 ) is a convex set on S m (S n ). Let {x 1 , x 2 , …, x s } ({y 1 , y 2 , …, y t })be the vertices of S 1 (S 2 ), then we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1 (Equivalence theorem of CBG). Let CBG = (S m , S
n , A, B) be the given constrained bi-matrix game. A necessary and sufficient condition that (x * , y * ) be an equilibrium point of CBG is that it is a solution of the following quadratic programming problem (QPP). Proof. Let S be the set of all feasible solutions of the above problem. Suppose S . For any (x, y, , ) S,
Similarly For a given CBG, if there is an equilibrium point of its corresponding BG satisfying the constraints then it certainly is an equilibrium point of the given CBG. But even if no equilibrium point of the corresponding BG satisfies the constraints, we can not ensure that the CBG must not have an equilibrium point. Here's a simple example. Consider a bimatrix game with the following payoff matrices
The game has only one equilibrium point in mixed form, i.e., (1/2, 1/2; 1/2, 1/2). For Player I, assume that the probability of the first strategy being selected must be greater than 0.6. It's not difficult to find the equilibrium point of this constrained bi-matrix game. That is, (0.6, 0.4; 1, 0). Example 3.1 Consider a bi-matrix game with the following payoff matrices:
Noting that this bi-matrix game is a modified version of the famous rock paper scissors game by adding 'one' to all players' payoff in each situation, then it's straight to find the unique equilibrium point, i.e., (1/3, 1/3, 1/3; 1/3, 1/3, 1/3). Now suppose that Player I faces with the following restriction:
Apparently the previous equilibrium point is no longer feasible. Now Player I's strategy space S 1 {x R m , x 1 0.5, e T x =1, x 0} is a triangle with three vertices, namely, {(1, 0, 0), (1/2, 1/2, 0), (1/2, 0, 1/2)}. Solving the following quadratic programming problem, 
A TWO-STEP METHOD FOR CONSTRA NED GAMES
Consider a constrained bi-matrix game CBG, let {x 1 , x 2 , …, x s } ({y 1 , y 2 , …, y t })be the vertices of S 1 (S 2 ), then any x S 1 (y S 2 ) can be expressed by a convex combination of {x 1 , x 2 , …, x s } ({y 1 , y 2 , …, y t }. Given (x, y) S 1 S 2 , Player I's payoff is ( ) Just as already seen, 'unconstrained' or 'constrained' is a relative distinction, a constrained game is an ordinary game itself. As long as the strategy space and payoff function of a constrained game satisfy appropriate conditions, see Glicks-
